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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FLOID C. HARTMAN and
RUTH A. HARTMAN,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
-vs-

Case No. 16004

ORA ANN POTTER, HUSKY
OIL COMPANY and CHEVRON
OIL COMPANY,
Defendants - Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ORA ANN POTTER

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to quiet title to a partial interest in
oil, gas and other mineral rights subject to a reservation of
those rights in a deed conveying the surface.
In the Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County the
case was decided on cross motions for summary judgment by the
Honorable David K. Winder, Judge, who quieted title to the disputed
mineral interest in Mrs. Ora Ann Potter, Defendant below, herein
referred to as Respondent.
On this appeal Respondent seeks to have the decision below
affirmed with costs awarded to Respondent.
FACTS
Respondent does not agree with or adopt Appellant's "statement
of facts"
have
mixed
fact,
theory
and
argument
Sponsored by because
the S.J. Quinney Appellants
Law Library. Funding for
digitization
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therein, although to the extent basic facts are asserted
Respondent raises no issue thereon.

Respondent's Statement of

Facts follows:
In July, 1946, William M. Potter conveyed to one C. R. Bennett
one-half of the mineral estate of the 160 acre parcel of land
which is the subject of this action.

Then, in 1951, the same

William M. Potter conveyed the surface of the same parcel by a
deed containing the following reservation:
"There is reserved unto the Grantors three-fourths (3/4)
of all the oil, gas, and mineral rights to the above land
belonging, with the right of ingress and egress thereon for
the purpose of finding and producing oil, gas, and minerals
thereon."
The deed was prepared by employees of a bank which acted as
escrow agent for the transaction.

The bank apparently acted under

the direction of, and on behalf of, both parties.
Deposition, pp. 11 and 12.)
prepared and signed in 1951.

(Floid C. Hartman

Hartman was present when the deed was
(Hartman deposition p. 12, line 10).

William M. Potter died and the subject land descended to
Ora Ann Potter, Respondent here.
Much later, from approximately 1967 to 1970 both Hartman and
Respondent leased mineral interests to various oil companies.

Oil

was subsequently discovered nearby and a part of the proceeds of
the production of that oil was due the owners of the minerals of
the subject parcel of land.

The portion allocable to one-half of

the mineral estate has been paid to Respondent Ora Ann Potter;
Appellant Hartman has received no royalties at all.
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In 1976 Hartman brought the action on appeal here on the
theory that he owns a part of the mineral estate of the parcel
as well as the surface.

Both parties agreed that there is no

genuine issue of material fact and filed cross motions for
summary judgment in the court below. 1
ISSUE
The single issue in this case is whether the three-fourths
mineral reservation in the deed from Respondent's predecessor in
interest successfully reserved the one-half interest which he had
at the time, or whether it somehow acted to reserve less than that
one-half interest.
POINT I
APPELLANTS HAVE NOT MET THE BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED BY OVERCOMING THE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY FAVORING THE TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION.
Appellants assign the error of the trial court as being one
of "fact" on page 6 of their brief where they complain, "Had the lower
court considered the conduct of the parties in arriving at its
1 Appellant Hartman did offer evidence in the trial court
in the form of testimony of Hartman on conversations with the
deceased William M. Potter. That testimony was barred by the
trial court with Appellant's acquiescence. Page 9 of the
hearing transcript shows:
"The Court: Well as far as any of the evidence of the
plaintiffs' getting in, Mr. Hisatake, that isn't going to
occur under the Deadman's Statute. Don't you acknowledge that?
Mr. Hisatake:

Yes."
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conclusion as to the intent of the parties .

An error of

fact in a suit in equity will lead to reversal only when the weight
of the evidence is clearly against the facts as found by the trial
court.

Clotworthy v. Clyde, 1 U.2d 251, 265 P.2d 420 (1954).

Appellants assign as errors in the court below that (1) the

de~

should have been construed against the grantor, and (2) that it
should be construed in favor of its fullest effect and against
ambiguity.

Far from overcoming the presumption that the trial

court ruled correctly, the first of these arguments of law is clearly
inapplicable under the law of Utah, as stated in Russell v. Geyser
Marion Gold Mining Company, 18 U.2d 363, 423 P.2d 487 (1967) and
Reese Howell v. Brown, et al., 48 Utah 141, 158 Pac. 684 (1916),
while the second proposition of law actually favors Respondent.
Both of these positions are more fully argued below.
This court defined the standard for overcoming the presumption
of validity of a trial court's decision in Searle v. Searle, 522
P2d 697 (Utah, 1974):
"The actions of the trial court are indulged with a
presumption of validity, and the burden is upon appellant
to prove such a serious inequity as to manifest a clear
abuse of discretion." (footnote omitted)
Appellants have simply failed to meet this burden with the
three conclusions reached in their brief, which are either inapplic~
or contrary to their position.
The Decision in the District Court was rendered in Summary
Judgment.

Under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, such

judgment may be had where there is no genuine issue of material
fact.
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In this case cross motions for summary judgment were filed,
supported by memoranda of each party relating consistent fact
descriptions.

No issue has been raised as to factual dispute, and

the matter does not invite factual controversy.

Thus the Summary

Judgment was properly rendered and the presumption of its correctness properly supported.
POINT II
CONTRARY TO APPELLANTS' POSITION, THEIR ACT OF LEASING THE DISPUTED
INTEREST IN THE MINERAL ESTATE DOES NOT STRENGTHEN THEIR CLAIM TO
THAT INTEREST.
Appellants argue on page 6 of their brief that their entry
into leasing arrangements "with various companies believing that
they owned a one-fourth (l/4) interest to the oil, gas and mineral
rights" evinces actual ownership of the minerals.
this argument is that a rule of construction

The thrust of

that a conveyance

should be construed to have the effect given it by the parties to
it -- should be applied.

This is a valid rule of construction, but

Appellants would apply it only to a portion of the facts in this
case.

It is undisputed that Respondent also leased her one-half

of the mineral rights that she believed (correctly, as the trial
court found)

that she owned.

It is in fact Respondent's lease and

the royalties paid Respondent thereunder that are the real subject
matter of this law suit.

In sum, these actions by the parties

to the deed cancel each other out.
But there is more to this rule of construction (which actually
favors Respondent's position) than the actions of the parties to
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the deed, acting alone.

Husky Oil Company and Chevron Oil Company

have become involved in this lawsuit as co-defendants because of the
effect they have given to the deed in question.

It is not only

undisputed, but was the substance of Appellants' complaint, that

these companies, aged and experienced giants of the petroleum industry,
and well advised by their own legal staffs, have agreed with
Potter in a most convincing way:

Respo~~

by paying to her the full royalties

attributable to her one-half mineral interest.

The overwhelming

weight of the treatment given the conveyance, by the greatest number
and most knowledgable of those affected by it, favor Respondent
Potter's ownership of one-half of the mineral estate.
Appellants misinterpret the cases cited in support of their
position.
351,

In Wood, et al., v. Ashby, et al., 122 Utah 580, 253 P.2d

(1952), cited by Appellants, the court looked to the acts of

the parties in giving practical effect to a deed.

Plaintiffs in

that case prevailed but it was Defendants' acts in giving practical
effect to the deed, contrary to Defendants' own interest, that
supported Plaintiffs' position.

In so noting the court said:

"The record reveals that defendants acted in such use of
the strip with the permission of plaintiffs, and when
interference with plaintiffs' rights resulted from such
activities defendants upon demand were quick to rectify
the situation."
253 P.2d at 354.

Thus it was defendants' actions which gave effect

to plaintiffs' rights.
In Garcia v. Garcia, 86 N.M. 503, 525 P.2d 863 (1974), also
cited by Appellant, acts of both parties combined to give the
effect found by the court.

525 P.2d at 865.
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In White v. Brooks, 266 OR 506, 512 P.2d 1350 (1973), likewise
cited by Appellant, it was the combined and cooperative efforts of
all parties in constructing a driveway that gave effect to the
contested deed.

2

All of these cases are distinguished from the

instant case by the absence of any act or omission on the part of
Respondent Potter that is in any way consistent with the ownership
by her of less than one-half of the entire mineral estate.
Appellants' position is simply not supported by either the facts
or the authorities cited.

The decision of the trial court was

grounded upon the "intent of the parties", as manifested by their
acts and the language of the deed.

The same arguments, based in

part on Hartman's self serving "consistent actions", were considered
and rejected by Judge Winder, who ruled that Respondent Potter was
the legal owner of the entire one-half interest in the minerals.
This Court has said that, when a trial court has looked to surrounding
circumstances in construing a deed, "[The Utah Supreme Court) will
not disturb [the trial court's) findings nor the judgment based
thereon unless the weight of the evidence is clearly against them."
Clotworthy v. Clyde, supra, 265 P.2d at 421.

In the instant case the

evidence clearly favors the trial court's decision and it should be
affirmed.
POINT III
THE RULE THAT A DEED SHOULD BE CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF THE GRANTEE
AND AGAINST THE GRANTOR IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE.
2 Plaintiff's other case, Clotworthy v. Clyde, supra, merely
states that a court may look to surrounding circumstances in
construing a deed, a point with which Respondent wholeheartedly agrees.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-7Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.

The paramount rule of construction of deeds is that the intent
of the parties governs.

The rule merely favoring grantee, because

he is the grantee, is a refuge of the last resort for a court with
no other grounds on which to make a decision.

In Russell v.

Geyser - Marion Gold Mining Company, supra, a reservation of
grazing rights was contested.

Ruling in favor of the grantor of

the contested deed, the Court said:
"This rule of construction favoring grantees is one
of the last rules of construction that should be applied
and need not be resorted to so long as a satisfactory
result can be reached by other more reliable rules. [23
Am. Jur. 2d §165.)
Clearly such a rule of construction
should be subordinate and yield to the paramount rule
that the intent of the parties is to be given effect if
it can be ascertained and if it does not contravene the
clear meaning of the words in the grant."
423 P. 2d at 490.

That holding was no novelty, having been adopted

by this Court in 1916, in response to the same argument being made
by Plaintiff here:
"We have, however, held, and are firmly committed
to the doctrine, that we will have recourse to every
aid, rule, or canon of construction to ascertain the
intention of the parties before having recourse to the
rule of construing the language of the parties either
most strongly against or in favor of either of them."
(Citations omitted)
Reese Howell Company v. Brown, et al., 48 Utah at 149, 158 Pac.
at 687.
In the instant case there are ample, inviting and preferable
alternatives to the arbitrary rule which simply says that the granW
of a conveyance should be favored.

The intent of the grantor to

reserve his minerals (indeed, to reserve more than he even had) and
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the actions of all parties taken together as argued above, make
application of the arbitrary rule avoidable, as an undesirable last
resort.

This Court, in the cases cited above, has stated that it

will avoid this arbitrary rule whenever possible.
POINT IV
CONSTRUCTION OF THE DEED IN FAVOR OF VALIDITY AND AGAINST AMBIGUITY
FAVORS RESPONDENT POTTER.
Appellants argue that the expressed intent of the 1951 deed, to
reserve a three-fourths mineral interest where only a one-half
mineral interest remained in the grantor, created an ambiguity.

The

document itself is not ambiguous at all; only the circumstances raise
a question.

Respondent submits that there is no issue of "ambiguity",

only of practical effect of the expressed intent of the document under
these circumstances.
Appellant argues that the deed, which purports to reserve more
than the grantor had, should be construed to reserve less than he
had, in order to give the "most logical" interpretation to the
instrument.

The converse, however, was more convincing to the

trial court (Hearing transcript page 4) .

If the grantor had

reserved exactly one-half of the mineral estate there surely would have
been no controversy; he would have reserved exactly what he had.
But instead he reserved three-fourths, despite the fact that he
only owned one-half.

The nearest to the full meaning and intent

of grantor that can be reached, as derived from the language, is to
give it the fullest effect possible:

reservation of the entire

one-half mineral interest that he owned.
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There is, by analogy, a Utah statute suggesting this same
result:
"§57-1-4. ATTEMPTED CONVEYANCE OF MORE THAN GRANTOR OWNS-EFFECT. -- A conveyance made by an owner of an estate for
life or years, purporting to convey a greater estate than
he could lawfully transfer, does not work a forfeiture of
his estate, but passes to the grantee all the estate which
the grantor could lawfully transfer."
This statute states a policy of giving the greatest effect to that
which is attempted, when that which is attempted cannot be practically
accomplished.

As the statute applies to over-conveyances, it can

likewise be applied to over-reservations.

Any other result would

deny consistency to the legislative policy behind the statute.
POINT V
APPELLANTS' ACTION WAS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
It was argued at the hearing on cross motions for summary judgment that this action was barred by the Statute of Limitations
(Hearing transcript page 9, lines 3-21).

Floid Hartman, Appellant

here and a grantee under the deed, states that he was aware that
Potter owned less than the full mineral estate at the time the
deed was delivered to him

(Hartman Deposition, p. 24, line 17-

22).

He was also present at the preparation and signing of the

deerl

(Hartman Deposition, p. 12, lines 9-10).

He was thus on

notice of any error or "ambiguity" such as he now alleges in the
deed on June 27, 1951, the day the deed was executed (Hartman
Deposition p. 5, line ll).

Application of any of Utah's statutory

limitations on actions would bar the cause having accrued on that
date.
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Beyond Appellants' actual notice of the prior conveyance of
one-half of the mineral estate there is the clear policy of Utah's
Recording Act, UCA 1953 §57-3-2, that all persons are put on
notice at the moment a conveyance is recorded, therewith commencing
the time period limiting any future actions.

From the moment a

person is put on such notice he has the duty to make his inquiries
and objections, within that statutory period, if he is ever to
do so.

Smith v. Edwards, 81 U. 244, 17 P.2d 264 (1932), McConkie v.

Hartman, 529 P. 2d 801 (Utah 1974).

If Appellant wished to

attack the reservation in the Potter deed as inconsistently
reserving three-fourths of the minerals while Potter only owned
one-half of the minerals he should have timely done so.

He did

not do so for 25 years and is now surely barred.
CONCLUSION
Appellants fail to meet the burden of overcoming the presumption
that the trial court's decision is valid.
Appellants' first argument

that the deed has been treated

by them as conveying a mineral interest to them -- fails, because
only they, in all the world, have so treated it.

Respondent Potter

has never, by act or omission, treated the deed as conveying an
interest to Appellants.

More significantly, Respondents Husky and

Chevron have recognized Potter's mineral interest and paid the
production royalties to her, and not to Appellants.
Appellants' second argument that the deed should be mechanistically construed against the grantor and in favor of the grantee --
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does not apply where other and preferable means of construction can
be employed.

Such other and preferable means are available here and

should be employed, consistent with this Court's stated policy.
Appellants' third argument -- that the deed should be construed
in favor of validity and against ambiguity -- actually favors
Respondent.

There is no ambiguity, but if there is, the rule of

construction gives greater effect to the language of the instrument
to reserve one-half, where it purports to reserve three-fourths,
than it would to reserve less than one-half.
Finally, Appellants' action was barred by any Utah Statute of
Limitations that may be applied to it, since the cause against
defendant Potter accrued in 1951, and Appellants were then aware of
it.

Twenty-five years passed thereafter, before this suit was

filed.
In Utah a conveyance is construed in accordance with the intent
of the parties as expressed in the document.

Where the expressed

intent is at odds with the factual situation, the court should
adopt a result most nearly approximating the expressed intent
within the constraints of the factual situation.

This rule, applied

to the instant case, would affirm the trial court by finding that the
grantor in the 1951 deed actually reserved a one-half interest in
minerals, rather than the three-fourths interest recited, because
this result most nearly approximates the intent expressed in the
document within the constraints of the factual situation.
For the reasons stated Respondent asks that the well reasoned
and correct decision of the trial court be affirmed.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12-

Respectfully submitted this

;2 ~

day of November, 1978.

THOMAS A. NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant - Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing were
this day deposited postage paid in the United States mails addressed
to Kenneth M. Hisatake, 1825 South 700 East, Salt Lake City,
Utah, 84105.
Dated this

day of November, 1978.
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